Hakirah 15
The Spiritual and the Tangible
The schools of Shammai and Hillel were intellectual and scholarly
rivals for hundreds of years and were major influencers of the development
of Torah. Between Hillel and Shammai there were only
three (possibly five) disputes. But 3168
arguments between the
schools they founded are recorded in the Talmud. Of these arguments,
221 revolve around various halachos, 66 are gezeiros (preventative
laws), and 29 are discrepancies over Biblical and legislative
interpretations. Despite Shammai’s tendency to be strict and Hillel
to be lenient, in 55 of these disputes (fully one-sixth), the school of
Shammai ruled on the side of leniency.
Many theories have been proposed as to the central (or at least
one of the central) differences between the schools. The theories as
to the core conceptual difference between the schools range from
psychological and hermeneutical, to socio-economic and analytical
preferences.
The Rogatchover Gaon’s key insight into the core difference
between Hillel and Shammai is related to their differing perspectives
on the degree to which spiritual versus tangible elements of
reality should be taken into account in determining halachah.
The Talmud (Chagigah 12a) states: “The school of Shammai
says, ‘The heavens were created first and then the earth.’ The school
of Hillel says, ‘The earth was created first and then the heavens.’”
What does this argument revolve around? Is there an underlying
theme?
Indeed there is. Shammai says the heavens were created first.
By heavens, Shammai means spirituality and the intangible. In
Shammai’s view, spirituality is the primary determinant in halachah
and is the main barometer of reality. It was created first since it is
the dominant reality.
[Spirituality in this context does not have any sort of otherworldly
implication. It simply means something that exists in our
universe yet is immaterial and lacks concrete substance.]
Hillel says, however, that in our physical world, material considerations
are of primary importance, and one must use the physical
spectrum as the dominant factor in deciding halachah. Therefore
the earth, meaning physicality, was created first.
The Rogatchover proceeds to pinpoint this dispute as the epicenter
of two Gemaras that seemingly have no connection to this.
The Talmud in Shabbos 62b states the following (I paraphrase):
A woman may not go out on Shabbos carrying a spice bundle
(an ornament worn around the neck in which women would
place spices so as to create a fragrance) or a flask of balsam oil.
If she did go out she has transgressed the Shabbos and is required
to bring a korban chatas (an atoning sacrifice in the
Temple). This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion.
Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says she has not transgressed the
Sabbath and is exempt from a korban. The reason she is exempt
is because a pendant containing spice or a small flask containing
oil are considered to be in the category of tachshit (ornaments).
Items that are categorized as a tachshit are Biblically
permitted to be worn on Shabbos since it is not considered carrying
when going out with them. Just as wearing a shirt on
one’s back is not considered “carrying,” so, too, items that,
while not being essential, have aesthetic or secondary uses and
benefits are allowed to be worn on one’s person.
Rabbi Eliezer then qualifies his ruling and states that she is only
exempt when the spice bundle contained spices inside and
the flask contained oil inside. But if they did not have spice or
oil inside them then she is obligated to bring a korban (meaning
she has transgressed the Sabbath). Since it is not the norm
to wear a pendant or a flask when they are empty, they are not
considered ornaments when worn empty. Therefore, since
they are not able to be classified as ornaments, they revert to
masa (carrying) status.
[To facilitate a fluid, smooth understanding of the next part of
the Gemara, it is necessary to preface the following principle about
carrying on Shabbos. In order to transgress the Shabbos it is not
enough to simply carry something outside in the public domain.
One must carry a certain minimum quantity in order to be Biblically
culpable. Each item has its own minimum requirement or shiur.
For example, one carrying food must take out (generally) enough
food equal to the size of a dried fig.
The minimum amount for other objects may be less or more,
depending upon the specific item in question. For example, one taking
out a vessel such as a jar would be Biblically liable even for carrying
out a tiny jar, since one has carried a whole, complete vessel.
With food, however, it is not dependent on whether one has carried
a complete item, but rather on the amount of food.]
The Talmud in Shabbos 93b discusses an intriguing case concerning
one who takes out a jar containing food, where the food does
not satisfy the minimum requirement yet the jar does satisfy the
shiur (since it is a complete vessel). What is the din (law)?
Seemingly, there should be no question as to their culpability.
For the jar (which satisfies the shiur) they are liable, and for the
food (which does not) they should not be liable.
Yet it is more complex than that. Since the jar is being used as a
receptacle for the food, it is viewed as not having its own independent
existence and is merely an accessory of the food. Thus, one is
not liable for carrying the jar, since it is not its own halachic entity.
Rather, it is an extension of the food. Yet for the food one also cannot
be liable since the amount of the food is less than the shiur.
Thus, counter-intuitively, for carrying out more (the food as well as
the jar) one ends up not being liable (as opposed to if one would
have just carried out the jar without the food, in which case one
would indeed have been liable).
The Gemara attempts to deduce something from Rabbi
Eliezer’s opinion. Rabbi Eliezer said that when the flask is empty
one is liable since then it is not a tachshit (because it is not the normal
custom to wear an empty flask).
But what about the scent of the balsam oil that still emanates
from the flask? Isn’t that comparable to the case brought before
where one took out food less than the shiur in a vessel? Here too one is taking out two things: the scent that is wafting
from the flask (which is less than the shiur, since scent has no substance
to which we could pin a minimum shiur) and the flask itself
(which satisfies the shiur since it is a complete vessel). Yet still Rabbi
Eliezer holds that one is liable in this case! Is he not arguing on the
Mishnah on 93b and forming his own opinion? According to the
Mishnah on 93b, one should not be culpable for the scent since it
lacks a minimum shiur, and also not for the flask, since the flask is
carrying the scent, and is therefore merely an accessory and extension
to the smell.
The Talmud answers that these two cases are not conceptually
parallel. Smell has no tangibility (leis bei mamasha) since it has no
substance, and the flask is considered empty and cannot be said to
be an accessory to the scent.
What essentially is the discussion here in the Gemara? The
Rogatchover sees it as being predicated upon the tension between
the tangible and the intangible realms.
Scent here is classified as belonging to the spiritual realm. It is
not tangible or concrete at all, and halachically it is viewed as being
the only sense that is a sensory tool of the soul, as opposed to being
a sensory faculty of the body. (This is why on Saturday night, at the
closing of Shabbos, we smell spices to comfort the soul as we head
into the lesser holiness of the week.)
This, then, is the point. Is smell part of our reality? Are nontangible
items viewed as determinants in our decisions and perspectives?
If they are, then the smell of the oil in the flask should be
viewed as being “something,” albeit less than the shiur. If that is so,
then the two cases are conceptually parallel and we can build a corollary
from one case to the other. That would dictate that just as
when one carries out food in a jar one is patur (exempt), since the
jar is considered to be an accessory to the food and the food itself
lacks the minimum requirement, so too when one carries out a
scented flask without actually having scented oil inside, one should
be patur, since again, one cannot be liable for the jar being that it is
an accessory of the scent.
If scent is not viewed as part of our considerations, and halachah
only deals with tangible factors, then fragrance is not considered an entity and the flask is properly defined as being empty, thus ending
any hopes of building a comparison between the two cases.
Peppery Potential
Another expression of this battle of perspectives is in a Mishnah in
Uktzin 3:6. The Mishnah records a dispute between Beis Shammai
and Beis Hillel regarding black cumin (katzach). Shammai says it is
tahor (ritually pure) and not susceptible to tumah (ritual impurity)
since it is not considered a food, as it is too harsh and bitter to eat.
Hillel says it is susceptible to tumah since it is able to be eaten. On
the surface they seem to be arguing about the physical existence of
cumin and disputing a factual truth, which is not considered to be
an optimal way of understanding halachah and Talmud (ein
machlokes b’metziyus).
However, our analysis will shed light on this strange, seemingly
factual, dispute. In order to do so, we must first avail ourselves of
another statement from the Talmud.
The Talmud in Berachos 40a states:
What is katzach? Rabbi Chama the son of Chanina said, one
who eats a lot of cumin (katzach) will not experience illness or
heart pains. Rabi Shimon ben Gamliel then asked, but katzach
is recorded as being one of 60 plants that hasten death?
The resolution in the Talmud is that one of the teachings (that
katzach averts pain and illness) was stated regarding its taste, and the
other (that katzach hastens death) was concerning its smell. The
smell is harsh and hastens death, whereas the taste is healthy and
wholesome.
That being the case, Beis Shammai holds that black cumin is not
susceptible to tumah since its smell is harsh and unhealthy and not
fit for consumption; whereas Beis Hillel holds that we only consider
tangible factors, and since smell is intangible it is not a factor.
Thus we only consider the taste, and the taste is healthy and fit for consumption. Therefore it is susceptible to tumah since it is
halachically considered a food.
Alcoholic Abstraction
This essential argument between these two schools is also reflected in the following Gemara in Berachos 43b:
If one has wine (which he intends to drink) and scented oil
(which he intends to smell) in front of him, he should take the oil
in his right hand and the wine in his left hand. He should then
make a blessing on the oil, smell it and then make a blessing on the
wine and drink it. This is the opinion of Beis Shammai.
Beis Hillel says the opposite: One should take the wine in his
right hand and the oil in his left, make a blessing on the wine and
then proceed to the oil.
The explanation given by the commentaries is that Beis
Shammai holds that the blessing on the oil takes precedence (and
thus is held in the right hand) since the pleasure gained from it is
immediate and does not require an action on one’s part, whereas the
wine’s pleasure is only once one drinks it and digests it.
Beis Hillel, however, reasons that wine, which is consumed by
the body, is more significant than oil, which is merely smelled,
therefore the blessing on the wine takes precedence.
This does not explain, however, why Hillel holds that tangible
intake of pleasure (consumption of the wine) is more significant
than intangible intake of pleasure (smelling)?
Additionally, what does Shammai say to Hillel’s point about
consumption of pleasure versus merely smelling pleasure?
According to our analysis it is clear. Hillel holds that tangible
pleasure is more significant than intangible pleasure in accordance
with his world view that tangible factors are the primary determinants,
as opposed to intangible factors. Shammai retorts that quite
the contrary, intangible and abstract factors are the primary determinants.
Thus the oil (merely smelling) takes precedence.
The Solidity of the Sotah Water
There is a debate in the Talmud about how much of G-d’s name
needs to be erased before we force the sotah to drink the sotah water.
Beis Hillel says at least two letters (the first yud and the first hei)
need to be erased. Beis Shammai says even one letter is enough to
compel the drinking of the water (Yerushalmi Sotah 2:4).
Elsewhere in the Gemara there is an inquiry concerning how
many letters a Sefer Torah must possess in order to retain its status
of sanctity. We know from the oral tradition that it needs 85 letters,
but the Rabbis weren’t sure if the 85 letters needed to be together,
or even if they are all from different parts of a Torah scroll (Shabbos
115b).
In addition, there is an argument about how many extra letters
invalidate a mezuzah—whether even just one or at least two extra
letters are required to make it passul (Menachos 32b).
What is the thread running through these questions? The commonality
they all share is that they all revolve around the identity
and character of a single letter. In the Hebrew language there are
no one-letter words. A word can be composed of even two letters,
but a single letter can never be a word. That being so, perhaps a letter
does not have its own inherent identity? Maybe it can never be.
Or perhaps there is some intrinsic meaning to a letter on its
own and it is considered to be its own halachic entity, notwithstanding
its deep-seated need to pair with another letter in order to
form a word.
Although seemingly disconnected, this is actually the same debate
that we saw regarding the sotah waters.
Shammai says that even
if only one letter of G-d’s name was erased, it is sufficient to activate
the full status of sotah. Shammai says this because in his view a single
letter is its own entity, and thus by erasing even one letter from
G-d’s name, one has fragmented the name of G-d and the sanctity of
the document has been destroyed.
Hillel disagrees. One letter on its own is nothing, and is merely
a part of the whole. Therefore, by erasing only one letter from
G-d’s name you have not erased a significant entity and therefore
the sanctity of G-d’s name is still there. Consequently, the sotah waters
were not activated and the woman is not forced to drink and
may still recant.
Obviously, this is also the debate regarding a mezuzah. If one
letter has intrinsic identity, then even one extra letter adds to the
mezuzah scroll and invalidates it.
This also applies to the “85-letters argument.” If a single letter
stands on its own conceptually and halachically, then the 85-letter
requirement can be satisfied from 85 single letters. If a letter is not
its own entity, then the 85 must be comprised of paired letters.
What does all this have to do with the differing Weltanschauungs
of Shammai and Hillel? Well, if tangibility is the primary determinant
of halachah and reality, then a single letter would not stand on
its own. This is because in concrete terms and from an empirical viewpoint, a single letter can never contain content or meaning.
Thus, a single letter on its own is not considered its own entity.
If, however, as Shammai asserts, intangibility and spiritual elements
are factors to be reckoned with, then a single letter does
stand on its own. This is because spiritually each letter of the Hebrew
alphabet contains intrinsic and individualized holiness and
metaphorical and symbolical meaning.
This whole subject is further amplified in light of how the
Rogatchover understands the infusion of holiness into G-d’s name.
The Yerushalmi in Berachos 5:1 states:
If a scribe was writing a Sefer Torah and was in middle of writing
the name of G-d, then even if the king himself asks him a
question, he is not allowed to respond.
Rambam codifies this in Hilchos Tefillin 1:15:
If one was writing a Torah and did not have full intent when
writing G-d’s name (kasav shelo lishmah), the entire Torah is
invalid. Therefore, if a scribe is in middle of writing G-d’s
name, he should not even respond to the king.
Simply speaking, the reason is that by responding to the king
the scribe is partially distracted and not able to have full concentration
on writing G-d’s name. Yet, why can’t the scribe stop writing,
respond and then continue writing G-d’s name? This way he could
have full concentration while writing G-d’s name, with only a short
intermission between starting to write and finishing the name.
The reason the Rogatchover offers is that G-dliness is not able
to be compartmentalized. What this means is that the name of G-d
in a Torah is expressing and constitutes an actual embodiment of
G-dliness. G-dliness is not an existence given to fragmentation and
disparate parts. Thus, since it is absolute and not able to be partitioned,
the physical letters of the name of G-d in which this G-dliness will be revealed and communicated to the
world) must also be one and absolute.
We can ask, however, why can’t the tangible expression be dissimilar
in its character from the idea and truth it carries and embodies?
This is because from the perspective of Torah and halachah the
physical must resonate and be a transparent conduit through which
G-dliness will flow into the world. There can be no friction between
the physical and the G-dly. Therefore the physical letters
(that are the expressers of the Divine truth inherent in the name of
G-d) must reflect in their physical character the G-dly characteristics
of Divine truth. They therefore cannot be written in a fragmented
manner.
Thus we find that the authentic way of writing G-d’s name was
by holding four quills in between the five fingers and writing all
four letters of G-d’s name at the same time. The knowledge of how
to perform this maneuver was known by one man who refused to
share it with others, bringing down the condemnation of the Sages
upon him. This explains an intriguing halachic discrepancy. The halachah
is that one is not allowed to write on Shabbos. How much does one
need to write in order to have transgressed this Biblical prohibition?
The halachah is that writing two letters violates the Biblical directive
not to write. Yet Yerushalmi Shabbos 13:1 states that “all
agree that regarding writing G-d’s name, one has not transgressed
until he writes the complete name of G-d (more than two letters).”
What is the reason for this legislative inconsistency concerning
writing G-d’s name? After writing a yud and hei (the first two letters
of G-d’s name) one should be liable to the full extent of the law!
Our analysis on the nature of the relationship between
G-dliness and the letters of G-d’s name, however, sheds light on this
enigma. Since the letters of G-d’s name are not given to fragmentation
and disparateness, therefore, by only writing two letters of
G-d’s name one has not written anything. The letters existentially
do not stand on their own and are viewed as an entity only in their
complete state of all four letters of G-d’s name together.
Domestic Dualities
This distinction remains valid in another important controversy,
regarding the relationship between two women who were both
married to a man who died childless. Generally, the deceased’s
brother would have a mitzvah to marry one of his brother’s widows.
There are situations, however, where a brother may be exempt
from yibum (marrying his brother’s widow) or chalitzah (performing
the ritual that releases his brother’s widow). One such case is if
the brother is related to the widow in a way such that yibum would
constitute a Biblically forbidden relationship — an “issur ervah” (see
Yevamos 3b). The first Mishnah in Yevamos lists those cases where
the widow would be forbidden to the brother but was not forbidden
to the deceased.
What about the other wives? If only one of the deceased’s wives
is forbidden to the brother, does that automatically exempt all the
other wives? There is a disagreement. Shammai permits the nonrelated
widows to marry the brother, and Beis Hillel forbids it
(Mishnah Yevamos 1:4).
According to Beis Shammai, from a legal point of view there is
no point in linking the fate of the widows together. The widow
who is his wife’s sister cannot enter into a Levirate marriage with
him because it is a prohibited marriage, while the other widows are
autonomous and can marry the brother of the deceased.
Beis Hillel holds the opposite: the two women are not autonomous;
their status is conditional on their being the ex-wives of the
same deceased man and their destinies continue to be interconnected.
What is the core matter being debated? Beis Shammai holds that
even though one of the wives is forbidden to the brother, this does
not affect the other wife. Why is this, though? The Talmud in
Yevamos 3b states that the other widows are released from any obligation
to the brother if any one of them is forbidden to the brother. Shammai, however, doesn’t view the prohibited wife as even existent
(ervah abrai kayma), that we would then be able to say that
due to her unavailability she exempts the other wives. Since she is
assur (forbidden) she is not even considered to be in front of the
court. This is because the issur is not peripheral or secondary, but
rather, an issur is laid onto the very essence of the forbidden item or
person. This is, of course, a more abstract and intangible “take” on
the nature of an issur.
Hillel, on the other hand, views the related and forbidden widow
as being here and existent in the case, just that the issur prevents
her from marrying the deceased’s brother. This is in keeping with
Hillel’s tangible and grounded worldview.
Categorical Colors
The Gemara in Chullin 136b brings a machlokes (dispute) between
Shammai and Hillel regarding different colored figs. The halachah is
that one cannot take terumah (one of five different types of tithes a
Jew had to take from his produce) from one species of produce for
another. So, for example, one could not take a tithe of oranges to
permit apples, etc. Each plant, vegetable or fruit had to have the
tithe separated from it to make the rest of that species of produce
permitted for consumption. Here the Gemara asks, what about taking terumah from black
figs in order to exempt and de-sanctify white figs? Is that permissible?
Beis Shammai says no and Beis Hillel says yes.
This is a dispute revolving around the tangible versus intangible
question. What is color? Is it merely an accessory part of an item, or
is it an absolute existence? Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim 1:73 discusses
the nature of color. He brings the opinions of the
Mutakallemim that color is intrinsic to physical matter. They say
that if one takes snow, for example, the white color is there in every
piece of snow and is part of its very existence.
Rambam, however, rejects their opinion and says that one sees
that when things are ground down into tiny flecks and turn into
powder the color is gone. Therefore, color is only part of the whole
and not existent in the individual parts.
At any rate, we see that there are differing perspectives on the
nature of color. According to some it is merely a superficial layer of
existence while others view it as being firmly part of the item that it
is coloring.
This, then, is the debate about black and white figs. According
to Hillel, we permit the taking of terumah from black to white, because
the different colors are not important and significant enough
to make us consider the black and white figs as different species of
produce. This is because the colors are only skin deep and not reflective
of the essence of the figs. This, in turn, is because Hillel is
grounded in concrete reality, which allows Hillel to see that different
colors are simply just that, and not existential divides.
Shammai, however, considers the differently colored figs to be
different types of fruit. Therefore, one cannot take terumah from
one to the other. This is the result of Shammai’s abstract perspective
that different colors actually create a different category.
Sinai and Harim/Quixotic Quality
Another instance of the Talmud’s preference can be seen in Horayos
14a: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis debated. One said
that sinai is a superior quality in learning, while the other side
said oker harim is a finer trait. Who is a man embodying sinai qualities? Rav Yosef. Who is a
man embodying oker harim abilities? Rabbah. They sent the
debate to the east (Eretz Yisrael) for a resolution and the answer
sent back was, sinai (vast knowledge) is superior.
Sinai verus oker harim is essentially a debate on quality versus
quantity. Sinai, which is broad global knowledge, is equivalent to
quantity of knowledge. Oker harim, which is localized sharp thinking,
is equivalent to quality of thought.
With this in mind, we can uncover a further layer of depth,
which is that quantity versus quality is, at its core, a debate about
tangibility versus intangibility.
Quantity is a tangible and quantifiable (the very word implies
concrete objective data) factor. It is a physical reality of having
more. For example, the concept that majority rules, since there are
more people who hold a certain view, is a concept predicated upon
tangible, readily observed phenomena.
Quality, on the other hand, is a whole different beast. It is nonconcrete
and intangible. Although the majority wants a certain approach,
if the minority is smarter and more experienced, follow
them, says quality.
We now come back to sinai versus harim. This is yet another
place where the Talmud makes clear its position that tangible factors
must outweigh (for the time being; see later) intangible elements.
Hence sinai is superior, hence quantity is superior (i.e., majority
rules in halachic decision-making), and hence tangible and physical phenomena must be of primary consideration to us, while
spiritual factors are of secondary importance.
What does this have to do with Shammai and Hillel? The Talmud
in Yevamos 14a records that Beis Shammai held the high
ground in terms of superior thinkers and scholars, while Beis Hillel
had a larger number of scholars and Torah legislators.
Beis Hillel, however, followed its own opinions l’halachah (practically).
This was an astonishing phenomenon, when one considers
that Beis Hillel knew and acknowledged Beis Shammai’s superior
caliber of scholars and legislators!
Yet according to our analysis, it was a phenomenon that makes
perfect sense. Since Hillel held the view that tangible factors must
always trump intangible ones, they concluded that their quantity of
scholars outweighed the quality of Shammai’s.
The Sin of Following Shammai’s Rulings
The Talmud in Berachos 58b relates the following:
Rav Pappa and Rav Huna were walking along a road and they
met Rabbi Chanina. Rabbi Chanina proceeded to make the
blessing of chacham harazim, telling them that they are as
wise as and equal to 600,000 people in his eyes.
They then rebuked him, saying, “Are you indeed this smart
and knowledgeable [to make such a character judgment]?” A
short time later, Rabbi Chanina died.
What is the deeper meaning of this enigmatic story? Rabbi
Chanina was a follower of Shammai. He subscribed to their
worldview. He therefore felt that since they were as wise as 600,000
people, he could make a blessing. Even though the required number of people to make the blessing was not gathered together, qualitatively
there was the requisite amount of wisdom.
Tangible Torah
Whom does halachah follow? Who has the final say? It turns out
that it’s not so simple. Although intangible and spiritual factors are
considered to be a stronger reality, as we will see in a discussion
about the era of Moshiach, tangibility is closer to the human experience,
and as such is the primary determinant in the decisionmaking
processes of Torah.
Since Torah is a system for dealing with our physical world and
since physicality is a stronger reality to us, therefore it is the main
factor in halachah. In light of this, consider the following halachah
(Yerushalmi Yuma 6:1). If one has two animals he can use for a korban, but one is
stronger and of superior stock while the other simply looks
better aesthetically, which one is he to bring? The one that is
stronger physically is the preferred animal and is used as the
korban.
The requirement regarding korbanos is to bring the best animal.
Here we are faced with a decision in which one animal is superior
physically while the other is superior in matters that are not as concrete.
Take the tangibly superior one, says the Torah, thus informing
us that when we need to make a decision, we should use tangibility
as our main measuring stick of reality.
Messianic Times
The Rogatchover’s pinpointing of the fundamentally different approaches
related to spirituality versus tangibility can be applied to
the well-known and fascinating assertion that in the times of the Moshiach the halachah will switch to be in accordance with Beis
Shammai (Mikdash Melech to Zohar, Vol. I, 17b).
In day-to-day life we grant supremacy to the tangible and material
while intangible factors are only accorded secondary status.
However, when Moshiach comes it will be a time of, as the
Rambam says (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Melachim 12:5): “The Jews
will be great sages, and know the hidden matters;” (Mishneh Torah,
loc. cit. 11:4): “Moshiach will perfect the entire world;” and (Isaiah
11:9): “They will neither harm nor destroy on all my holy mountain,
for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the L-rd as the
waters cover the sea [bed].”
When Moshiach comes, our spectrum of reality will be elevated
to a more refined and subtler level. Spiritual and intangible truths
will resonate even within our physical spectrum.
The halachic switch to Shammai will be an instinctive natural
gravitation instead of a conscious legislative effort. The fragrance of
the small vessel being carried on Shabbos will seem real and practical,
the intrinsic independent identity of a single letter will be clear,
and the validity of subscribing to a spiritual-based worldview will
seem compelling and precise
